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Abstract
Episodes of extraordinary turbulence in global financial markets are examined
during eight crises ranging from Asia in 1997-98 to the recent great recession of
2008-10. The analysis focuses on changes in the dependence structures of equity
markets through correlation and coskewness to answer the question of whether
the great recession is diﬀerent to other crises in terms of shock transmission
through contagion. The results show that ‘this time is diﬀerent’ and that the
great recession is truly a global financial crisis. Other US sourced crises do not
aﬀect other markets through contagion, and emerging market crises transmit un-
expectedly.
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1 Introduction
The impressive body of work of Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008a,b) historically analyses
eight centuries of financial crises and conveys a simple message. Society convinces itself
that in contrast to prior episodes in history, the prosperity that tends to precede crises
is a permanent fixture of the economy. House and equity prices will increase into the
foreseeable future, usually because of the competence of policy makers compared to
the past, the view that economic fundamentals are sound, and that growth enhancing
structural reforms and technological innovations will continue to be successful. This is
what Reinhart and Rogoﬀ refer to as the "This Time Is Diﬀerent Syndrome". Then
comes the crash.
This paper examines the syndrome of "This Time Is Diﬀerent" from an alternative
view point. The "crash" of eight crisis episodes is taken to establish in what sense
"This Time Is Diﬀerent" in terms of their international transmission during, rather
than before, each episode. Countries with poor or similar fundamentals and even those
with sound fundamentals suddenly worry that they too will be aﬀected by the crisis and
many take unprecedented steps to contain the transmission from the crisis markets to
their own. Panic tends to set in amongst the financial and policy making communities
as markets are not only linked through their normal mechanisms, but linkages that
did not seem to exist before the crisis suddenly appear. These second type of linkages
are referred to as contagion, and it is the nature of these little understood linkages
that we seek to understand from a multi-crisis dimension. The work is also related to
Dungey et al. (2009) in theme, but diﬀerent in framework, which explores whether or
not financial market crises are alike in equity and bond markets.
Contagion tests are about detecting sudden changes in dependence structures be-
tween markets which occur once a crisis is triggered. Early forms of contagion tests
which intuitively convey its meaning are the correlation change tests of King and
Wadhwani (1990) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002). After conditioning on economic
relationships that exist in both of the non-crisis and crisis periods, a rising correlation
of shocks between financial markets in the crisis period compared to the non-crisis
period indicates that the nature of the transmission of shocks has changed and there
is evidence of contagion. This idea is extended in Fry, Martin and Tang (2010) and
applied here to examine contagion across markets through changes in higher order de-
pendence structures such as coskewness. Contagion is defined as a significant change
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in the dependence structures of asset returns during a crisis compared to a non-crisis
period.
The tests developed in Fry, Martin and Tang (2010) draw on an idea from the
univariate setting that the distribution of asset returns during crises can switch from
negative to positive skewness as the preferences of risk averse agents change in a crisis
period. In a crisis, agents prefer positive skewness and are apt to accept lower average
returns in exchange (Ingersoll, 1990; Harvey and Siddique, 2000; Fry, Martin and
Tang, 2010). Connecting markets as agents adjust their cross market risk preferences
is the multivariate version of this relationship of coskewness. In essence, coskewness
measures the correlation between the volatility of a source asset market and the average
returns of a recipient market or vice versa. In a crisis, increasingly risk averse investors
prefer positive to negative coskewness as investors seek to minimize their losses having
conditioned on increased volatility. The coskewness contagion tests are related in spirit
to the work in Yuan (2005) and Guidolin and Timmerman (2009) who focus on the
role of skewness and/or kurtosis preferences in understanding asset prices given investor
preferences or behavior.
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008a,b) document the "This Time Is Diﬀerent" phenomena
by focusing on sovereign debt crises, domestic debt crises, banking crises, inflation
crises and exchange rate crises. The approach here is to focus on the international
transmission of crises through daily equity market returns during eight crisis episodes.
The equity market is chosen as it is relatively liquid in most countries and the duration
of several crises is on the short side, making it diﬃcult to capture in quarterly or other
lower frequency transmission. It is also likely that the panic reflected in investor and
policy maker behavior referred to earlier is a short term phenomenon. The macro-
economic triggers of the eight crises though are drawn from the types investigated by
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ.
One important distinction that Reinhart and Rogoﬀ make in their book is between
a true global financial crisis and a severe financial crisis. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ develop a
metric of financial turbulence to quantitatively measure the severity of crises regionally
and globally. In their definition of a global financial crisis, one of their criteria is that
a global financial centre is also experiencing a severe crisis, with the idea that they
are in the position to transmit crises through financial flows emanating through the
centre. The framework of this paper is able to provide evidence on the existence of such
a global financial crisis with four of the eight crises episodes being sourced in the US
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market.1 This transmission channel is also related to the centre and periphery concepts
of Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003). Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003) argue that often
the centre is a conduit of a crisis from one region to another without necessarily being
impacted itself, and without being the trigger of the crisis per se. This paper provides
some evidence on this eﬀect by examining the transmission of contagion across four
diﬀerent crises sourced in emerging markets by finding that crises sourced in emerging
markets often have unanticipated consequences particularly for developed markets.2
The main empirical finding with respect to the US sourced crises is that "This
Time Is Diﬀerent". The great recession in the period following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers is more widespread in terms of the transmission of contagion compared to
the US based and emerging market crises in the sample and is truly a global financial
crisis. In contrast to the great recession, it is not the case that crises beginning in a
major financial centre have important consequences for the rest of the world through
the channels of contagion. The little contagion evident in the LTCM and dot-com
crises suggests that shocks from a well integrated market do not result in surprise
transmissions. This is not to say that there is no crisis transmission through normal
dependence structures, but that there is no contagion.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the context in which
the financial community and policy makers proclaim that "This Time Is Diﬀerent".
Section 3 specifies the contagion tests based on changes in correlation and coskewness
and specifies the methods to control for interdependencies. Section 4 presents the crises
and the empirical results, with Section 4.3 describing the sense in which "This Time Is
Diﬀerent" by examining the transmission channels of contagion for crises sourced in the
US and in emerging markets. It then presents an index of crisis severity constructed
for the great recession as it evolved through 2007 to 2010. Section 4.4 focuses on
issues surrounding the dating of the crisis periods and the choice of the benchmark to
compare the crisis period dynamics. Section 5 concludes.
1The US sourced crises correspond to the near collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM), the collapse of the speculative bubble surrounding the dot-com industries, the
sub-prime shock and the more severe phase of that crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers
which is labeled the great recession.
2The emerging market crises are the Asian crisis, the Russian crisis, the Brazilian crisis and the
Argentinian crisis.
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2 This Time Is Diﬀerent
As Reinhart and Rogoﬀ well document, from an historical perspective, financial market
crises are seemingly common place. Equity price data for the twelve countries of this
paper are presented in Figure 1 from 1995 to 2010. The shaded areas on this diagram
indicates periods of crises in some equity markets around the globe, with the crises
originating in diverse regions including Asia, Russia, the US and Latin America. The
crises include the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the Russian and LTCM crises of
1998, the Brazilian devaluation of 1999, the dot-com crisis of 2000, the Argentinian
crisis of 2001-2002, the sub-prime crisis of 2007-2008 and the great recession of 2008-
2010.
Figure 1 shows how dramatically markets can plummet when a crisis occurs, and
also illustrates the connectedness of equity markets as falls occur simultaneously. Yet
anecdotally crises appear to take policy makers, financial and economic systems by sur-
prise. Speculation during the Asian crisis in the US was that a recession was imminent
and that American workers would lose their jobs (Galbraith, 1998). The Russian and
LTCM crisis was concluded to be the "worst crisis ever" (Committee on the Global Fi-
nancial System, 1999), and in the recent great recession it was expected that emerging
countries would experience "sudden stops" (Blanchard, 2008).
In the midst of crises, uncertainty usually on the downside, pervades policy, finan-
cial and economic systems. Usually the leaders of most governments and policy orga-
nizations such as Central Banks and the IMF try to bring calm to markets through
their measured statements. However, their actions such as dramatic, surprise interest
rate cuts, often belie their beliefs of the seriousness. It is often media and financial
commentators who express the crisis in terms of the panic ("This Time Is Diﬀerent")
experienced and emotional responses to crises reflected in plummeting indicators of
consumer and business confidence (see Figure 2 for the US target Federal Funds Rate
and indicators of consumer and business confidence). In hindsight, the drama of the
media is sometimes just that, but in the midst of a crisis it is diﬃcult to tell.
3 Contagion Tests
To formally analyze the extent that each crisis transmits from a source market to
others through channels of contagion, three tests of financial market contagion are
adopted. The tests are documented in detail in Fry, Martin and Tang (2010), and are
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Figure 1: Daily equity prices (natural logs) - September 1, 1995-April 26, 2010. The
shaded areas refer to episodes of crisis in international equity markets. These are (i) the
Asian financial crisis (October 17, 1997 to January 30, 1998); (ii and iii) the Russian
bond default and the LTCM crisis (Russia: August 17, 1998 to December 31, 1998;
LTCM: September 23, 1998 to October 15, 1998); (iv) the Brazilian crisis (January 7,
1999 to February 25, 1999), (v) the dot-com crisis (February 28, 2000 to June 7, 2000);
(vi) the Argentinian crisis (October 11, 2001 to June 30, 2002); (vii) the sub-prime
crisis (July 26, 2007 to September 14, 2008); and (viii) the great recession (September
15, 2008 to April 26, 2010).
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Figure 2: US Federal Funds Rate (target) and Consumer and Business Confidence
Indexes. September 1, 1995 to April 26, 2010. Sources: FRED database and Trading
Economics respecitively.
briefly summarized here. The underlying model used in motivating the tests builds
on the portfolio model of risk of Harvey and Siddique (2000). Fry, Martin and Tang
(2010) extend the mean-variance framework to account for the higher order dependence
structures between assets discussed here. The expected excess return on assets is
expressed in terms of risk prices which are a function of the risk preferences of investors,
and risk quantities which are a function of higher order conditional moments including
skewness and coskewness.
The statistical tests are derived in Fry, Martin and Tang (2010) from a family
of bivariate distributions based on the generalized exponential distribution of Cobb,
Koppstein and Chen (1983) and Lye and Martin (1993). In that framework, the bi-
variate normal distribution is extended to allow for dependence structures through
higher order comoments with Lagrange Multiplier Tests derived as the basis of the
tests for contagion. The first test of contagion is a correlation based test similar to
that used in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and refined in Fry, Martin and Tang (2010),
which tests for changes in correlations across diﬀerent sample periods. The second
and third tests identify contagion as a significant change in (two alternative forms of)
coskewness across markets during periods of financial market instability compared to
normal times. The identification of contagion using each of these tests rests partly on
the specification of a crisis source asset market denoted by  while  represents the
recipient market.
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3.1 Interdependencies
The definition of contagion can be interpreted as comovements in asset returns not
due to the cross market interdependencies that exist in all states . As is standard
in the contagion literature (see particularly the precedents set in Forbes and Rigobon,
2002) the data is adjusted in several dimensions to control for interdependencies and
domestic economic conditions by estimating a VAR of the form
 =  () + Φ () +  (1)
where  is the vector of returns of all equity markets in the sample,  contains other
relevant observable economic data for all markets,  () and Φ () are vectors of lags of
 and  respectively, and  is the vector of residuals. Own market conditions and cross-
market interdependencies in the data are controlled for through the combined eﬀects
of  () and Φ ()  These parameters capture the transmission of shocks occurring
through relationships that exist in all states of nature. It is the residuals of the VAR,
()  that are used as the returns in the calculation of the test statistics of contagion of
Sections 3.2 and 3.3. To this end  is separated into non-crisis ( | = 0) and crisis
( | = 1) period data depending on an exogenous choice of state
 =
½
0 : non-crisis
1 : crisis

with sample sizes  and  respectively so that  = ¡1 2   1 2  ¢ 
3.2 Correlation Contagion Test
Correlation coeﬃcients may be biased upwards because of increased volatility in asset
returns in the source market during financial market crises. Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
show how this bias can be removed using
b| = bq
1 +  ¡1− b2¢  (2)
which adjusts the unconditional correlation coeﬃcient ¡b¢ of the crisis period be-
tween the source and recipient countries for heteroskedasticity. The denominator of
the conditional correlation coeﬃcient ¡b| ¢ includes a term  = 2 − 22 which is
the proportionate change in the volatility of returns in the source equity market 
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where 2 and 2 are the sample variances of equity returns in market  during the
non-crisis and crisis periods.
The correlation test presented here is slightly diﬀerent to that of Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) as the data period is non-overlapping (Fry, Martin and Tang, 2010). The
statistic for contagion () based on the significance of a change in the adjusted
crisis period correlation compared to a non-crisis period correlation (b) from  to 
can be represented as3
(→ ) =
⎛
⎝ b| − bq
  ¡b| − b¢
⎞
⎠
2
 (3)
The null hypothesis of no contagion between two equity markets is
0 : | = 
against the alternative hypothesis of contagion
1 : | 6= 
Under the null hypothesis of no contagion, the correlation test of contagion is asymp-
totically distributed as  (→ ) −→ 21 The test here is a two sided test in contrast
to Forbes and Rigobon (2002) to allow for a more general interpretation of contagion
where contagion is considered to be any significant change in the dependence structures
between the markets considered.
3.3 Coskewness Contagion Tests
Analogous to the correlation test for contagion, the coskewness tests for contagion
from the source market  to the recipient market  seek a significant change in the
3The standard error in equation (3) is presented in Fry, Martin and Tang (2010), where
  ¡b| − b¢ =   ¡b| ¢+   (b)− 2 ¡b| b¢
  ¡b| ¢ = 12 (1 + )2£1 +  ¡1− 2¢¤3
∙
1

³¡
2− 2
¢ ¡
1− 2
¢2´
+
1

³
2
¡
1− 2
¢2´¸
  (b) = 1 ¡1− 2¢2
 ¡b| b¢ = 12 1 
¡
1− 2
¢ ¡
1− 2
¢
(1 + )q£
1 +  ¡1− 2¢¤3 
8
distribution of the returns across a non-crisis and crisis period. Coskewness is a third
moment and can take two forms. The first is denoted b ¡1  2¢ and is given by
b ¡1  2¢ = 1
X
=1
( − b)1 ¡ − b¢2  (4)
This form of coskewness is a function of the relationship between the (demeaned) level
of the equity returns of asset  ( − b)1 and the volatility of the demeaned equity
returns of market  ¡ − b¢2.
The second form of coskewness is b ¡2  1¢, where
b ¡2  1¢ = 1
X
=1
( − b)2 ¡ − b¢1  (5)
This form of coskewness is a function of the volatility of the (demeaned) equity returns
of the source market  ( − b)2 and the level of the (demeaned) equity market returns
of  ¡ − b¢1, the recipient country.
The contagion tests looking for significant changes in the coskewness coeﬃcients in
a crisis
³b´ compared to a non-crisis ³b´ period are denoted 1 and 2 and are
given by
1 ¡→ ; 1  2¢ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
b ¡1  2¢− b ¡1  2¢s
4b| + 2
 +
4b2 + 2

⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
2
 (6)
2 ¡→ ; 2  1¢ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
b ¡2  1¢− b ¡2  1¢s
4b| + 2
 +
4b2 + 2

⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
2
 (7)
where
b ¡   ¢ = 1
X
=1
µ − bb
¶µ − bb
¶
 (8)
b ¡   ¢ = 1
X
=1
µ − bb
¶µ − bb
¶
 (9)
The terms      are the mean of the equity returns of market  and  in
the crisis and non-crisis periods, and      are the corresponding standard
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errors. The diﬀerences in the tests are dependent on whether the equity market at
the source of the crisis is expressed in accordance with the levels of the returns (the
first coskewness test) or the squared returns (the second coskewness test) in computing
coskewness.
The coskewness contagion tests are two sided tests, with the null and alternative
hypotheses using statistic 1 and 2 given by
0 : (   ) = (   )
1 : (   ) 6= (   )
Under the null hypothesis of no contagion, the coskewness test of contagion is asymp-
totically distributed as
1 (→ )  2 (→ ) −→ 21 (10)
4 Eight Episodes of Crises
This section applies the three forms of contagion tests to equity markets in the eight
most recent financial market crises. Prior to presenting the empirical results, this
section presents the data and the dating and triggers of the crises, and then further
explores issues surrounding the choice of non-crisis period and the dating of the crises.
4.1 The Data and Sample
The sample consists of daily equity price indices () expressed in US dollars collected
for the  = 12 equity markets of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Hong
Kong, Japan, Russia, Korea, Thailand, the UK and the US. This choice of markets
covers a selection of emerging markets, developedmarkets, regions, markets that are the
trigger of a crisis and others who are not directly involved. The sample period begins
September 1, 1995 and ends April 26, 2010, for a total of  = 3822 observations. Daily
percentage equity returns () of the  market are calculated as
 = 100 (()− (−1))  (11)
Equation (1) is estimated to extract the data  net of interdependencies, with 
containing the short term interest rates for the  markets.4 A lag order of  = 5 in
4December 19 and 20 2006 are dummied out of the data for Thailand due to outliers
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 () is chosen using the results of the Aikaike Information and the Hannan-Quinn
lag order selection criteria. The lag structure for Φ () is set at  = 15 The interest
rates in  are one of the few variables available at a daily frequency able to capture
macroeconomic aspects of the economy which also aﬀect equity markets. To control
for time zone diﬀerences and following Forbes and Rigobon (2002), the data is adjusted
by using the two day rolling average of returns. Following these data manipulations,
the sample size is  = 3815 and the eﬀective sample period is September 12, 1995 to
April 26, 2010.
As a point of reference for understanding the properties of the non-crisis and crisis
period data, Table 1 provides some preliminary statistics on the characteristics of the
series on a univariate and multivariate basis. The crisis statistics are presented for the
first 100 days of that crisis representing a sub-period of the most uncertainty.
The main points to note from these tables are that in the non-crisis period, all
returns are positive compared to the crisis period where all are negative. All countries
reported values of negative skewness apart from the US in the non-crisis period, while
in the crisis period almost all countries reported positive skewness coeﬃcients, or at
least moved in that direction. This result confirms investors actively investing in risky
assets and being prepared to accept the risk of large losses in return for higher returns in
the non-crisis period. Also evident is the reversal of this relationship during the crisis
period. In terms of the statistics measuring dependence across markets, the simple
correlation coeﬃcients of all countries with the US are much higher in the crisis period
than in the non-crisis period, with the exception of that for Japan. Examination of
the coskewness coeﬃcients b ¡1  2¢ and b ¡2  1¢ of each country with the US also
appear to change substantially across the non-crisis and crisis periods.
4.2 Dating and Triggers
As contagion tests are conditioned on a ‘state’ of nature , the dating of the crisis
periods is an essential component. Often there is no consensus to the dating of a crisis
and this is clearly an area of future research (Kose, 2011). There is a body of work
emerging where the dates of historical crises of diﬀerent types are defined but this
applies mainly to banking crises which is not necessarily applicable here, and they are
not necessarily consistent across papers. See for examples Caprio et al. (2005), Laeven
and Valencia (2008), Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008b) and Reinhart (2010).
5Results of the lag specification tests are available on request.
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Table 1:
Preliminary statistics for the (i) non-crisis period prior to the sub-prime crisis; and
(ii) the first 100 days of the great recession.
Mean Min Max Std Dev Skewness Correlation Coskew 1 Coskew 2
(i) Non-crisis
Arg. 0.155 -10.461 7.514 1.825 -0.321 0.243 -0.172 -0.077
Aus. 0.086 -3.785 3.883 0.985 -0.414 0.034 0.069 -0.222
Bra. 0.154 -8.572 12.728 2.156 -0.229 0.404 -0.227 -0.133
Can. 0.080 -4.857 3.907 0.952 -0.415 0.518 -0.046 0.128
Ger. 0.101 -5.016 4.492 1.036 -0.580 0.338 -0.123 -0.094
HK. 0.060 -4.224 4.049 0.979 -0.113 0.126 0.053 -0.189
Jap. 0.039 -6.509 4.248 1.312 -0.286 0.068 -0.010 -0.147
Kor. 0.096 -6.269 5.266 1.407 -0.381 0.096 -0.066 -0.337
Rus. 0.133 -10.605 9.619 1.712 -0.819 0.134 0.095 -0.091
Thai. 0.078 -16.064 9.673 1.392 -1.154 0.032 0.058 -0.249
UK 0.047 -5.309 5.570 1.070 -0.191 0.421 0.024 0.094
US 0.030 -4.751 6.155 0.933 0.312 1.000 0.312 0.312
(ii) First 100 days of the great recession
Arg. -0.562 -12.864 10.882 4.247 -0.311 0.582 -0.367 -0.250
Aus. -0.591 -16.002 8.509 4.673 -0.600 0.222 0.023 0.073
Bra. -0.570 -17.963 16.857 6.325 0.064 0.715 0.181 0.208
Can. -0.538 -13.789 9.925 4.487 -0.214 0.720 -0.256 -0.096
Ger. -0.571 -11.326 11.887 4.012 0.392 0.530 0.186 0.076
HK. -0.399 -13.589 13.404 4.147 0.375 0.386 0.527 0.478
Jap. -0.259 -11.186 11.644 3.680 -0.032 0.011 0.177 -0.059
Kor. -0.472 -14.691 15.695 4.723 0.124 0.227 0.199 0.118
Rus. -0.961 -21.199 20.204 6.042 0.162 0.268 -0.113 -0.113
Thai. -0.429 -11.599 7.849 3.020 -0.618 0.389 -0.156 0.094
UK -0.511 -10.538 12.219 4.149 0.294 0.532 0.056 -0.013
US -0.360 -8.201 10.508 3.439 0.323 1.000 0.323 0.323
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Table 2:
Crisis and non-crisis period dates.
Crisis and non-crisis periods Start of period End of period Obs.
(i) Crisis period dates ()
Asia (1) 17 October 1997 30 January 1998 76
Russia (2) 17 August 1998 31 December 1998 99
LTCM (3) 23 September 1998 15 October 1998 17
Brazil (4) 7 January 1999 25 February 1999 36
Dot-com (5) 7 March 2000 7 June 2000 67
Argentina (6) 11 October 2001 30 June 2002 187
Sub-prime (7) 26 July 2007 14 September 2008 297
Great recession (8) 15 September 2008 26 April 2010 421
(ii) Non-crisis period dates ()
Pre Asia (1) 12 September 1995 16 October 1997 548
Pre Russia, post Asia (2) 31 January 1998 14 August 1998 140
Pre Brazil, post Russia (3) 1 January 1999 6 January 1999 4
Pre Dot-com, post Brazil (4) 26 February 1999 6 March 2000 267
Pre Argentina, post Dot-com (5) 8 June 2000 10 October 2001 350
Pre Sub-prime/great recession, 7 January 2002 25 July 2007 1323
post Argentina (6)
The Appendix contains a summary of papers written on one or more of the eight
crises in equity markets that are considered here. It contains the market defined to be
the crisis source, along with the dates that each author chose to represent the non-crisis
and crisis periods. The datings chosen for the six non-crisis and eight crisis periods are
drawn from the work in these tables, and are summarized in Table 2.
The principles of choosing the crisis dates are similar to Dungey et al. (2009) and
are loosely that a trigger event marks the beginning of the crisis, and where possible,
an event or a policy reform marks the end of a crisis. The rest of the paper will adopt
the notation to distinguish the crises in the sample by  for the non-crisis periods,
and  for the crisis periods, with  = 1 6 and  = 1 8 referring to non-crisis and
crisis periods occurring throughout the sample.
The diﬃculties in defining a crisis period also apply to choosing the non-crisis ()
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period for comparison in the contagion tests. As is shown by the shading in Figure
1, crisis periods can be clustered close together making it diﬃcult to choose a non-
crisis period not contaminated by other extreme events. As this paper is focused on
examining multiple crises in several regions, care is taken to select the non-crisis periods
as well as the crisis periods to ensure that they are representative.
The principle in choosing the non-crisis periods is that where possible, the data in
the non-crisis period preceding the crisis is used as the non-crisis data. This choice is
based on information availability to the policy maker and portfolio decision makers in
real time. As some crises run into each other in time, where a useful tranquil period
directly prior to each crisis is not available, the most sensible pre-crisis data is used.
Section 4.4 explores this issue further. The macroeconomic triggers for each crisis along
with the dating of the non-crisis and crisis periods follow.
Asia The Asian crisis (1) is defined to extend from 20 October, 1997 to January
30, 1998 (1 = 76). The trigger is the speculative attack on the Hong Kong currency
and equity markets. It is common to use October 20 as the start date of the crisis,
with the alternative corresponding to the devaluation of the Thai baht in July, 1997
(see Corsetti et al., 2005; Dungey, Fry and Martin, 2006; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).
As equity markets are the focus of this paper, the Hong Kong attack is the source here.
The end date is generally consistent with several of the papers listed in the Appendix
and is chosen to be the end of January to avoid clashing with the Russian crisis period.
The pre-Asia non-crisis period (1) extends from 12 September, 1995 to 16 October,
1997.
Russia and LTCM The Russian crisis (2) begins on August 17, 1998 and ends
December 31, 1998 (2 = 99). The Russian Government deferred bond repayments
on this date, marking the beginning of extreme asset market volatility. The majority
of work on Russia summarized in the Appendix chooses the crisis period for Russia to
be either early or mid August. The LTCM crisis (3) is linked to events in Russia and
is nested within the Russian crisis period. The beginning coincides with the Federal
Reserve of New York bailout of LTCM on September 23, 1998, and ends with the
inter-FOMC interest rate cut on October 15 (3 = 17). See Dungey et al. (2007)
and Committee on the Global Financial System (1999). The pre-Asia non-crisis period
(1) is used as it not clear that the turmoil in Asia really had subsided between
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February and August 1998.
Brazil The trigger of the Brazilian crisis (4) is a currency devaluation. On
January 15, 1999, the real was devalued, however, the start date of the crisis is taken
to be January 7, 1999 as substantial foreign reserves were lost prior to that. The end of
the crisis corresponds to a revised IMF program on February 25, 1999 which appeared
to calm markets (4 = 36). As the crisis in Brazil began just one week following the
end of the Russian crisis, the pre-Asia non-crisis period (1) is also used.
Dot-com The dot-com crisis (5 ) occurring when the tech-stock bubble col-
lapsed corresponds to that chosen in Dungey (2009) et al. and is based on visual
inspection of the equity returns. A large component of that paper is sensitivity to the
dating of crisis periods. The dot-com crisis extends from March 7, 2000 and ends June
7, 2000 (5 = 65). This crisis is probably the least dramatic of the crises sourced in
the US market with it mainly aﬀecting one sector of the economy. However, at the time
the real and transmitted eﬀects were uncertain. The non-crisis period (4) extends
from February 26, 1999 to March 6, 2000 and is between the Brazilian and dot-com
crises.
Argentina Apart from the great recession, the Argentinian crisis (6) is longest
in duration (6 = 187). The trigger of the crisis is the introduction of the partial
deposit freeze and capital controls (Cifarelli and Paladino, 2004), and the crisis is
chosen to begin just prior to this on October 11, 2001. The end of the crisis is more
diﬃcult to date. Dungey et al. (2009) and Wälti and Weder (2008) use mid 2005 which
coincides with Argentina’s return to the voluntary bond market. However, this dating
is more consistent with events in the bond market rather than equity markets. The
bond market in Argentina remained in crisis for quite a long time compared to the crisis
in the equity market. For the application here, the end date is taken to be June 30,
2002 and is determined by visual inspection. This period encompasses the collapse of
the currency board in Argentina in 2002. See IMF (2003) for a comprehensive overview
of the events in Argentina. The non-crisis period (5) extends from June 8, 2000 to
October 10, 2001 and is between the dot-com and Argentinian crises.
Sub-prime and Great Recession The final two crises are the sub-prime crisis
(7) and the great recession (8). Although these crises could be considered to be the
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one event, they are separated because of the severity of the collapse of Lehman Brothers
in September of 2008. The start date of the sub-prime crisis is chosen to coincide with
heightened risk aversion and falls in liquidity from July 26, 2007 (7 = 297)  The
great recession is still arguably underway but is defined to span from September 15,
2008 to April 26, 2010 when the data was collected (8 = 421) days. The non-crisis
period for both sub-prime and the great recession (6) extends from January 7, 2002
to July 25, 2007, between the Argentinian and sub-prime crises.
4.3 Contagion Channels During Crises
4.3.1 This Time Is Diﬀerent
Table 3 presents the empirical results for the correlation and coskewness tests for the
four crises with the source specified to be the US. Inspection of this table shows that
the great recession is truly diﬀerent to all other crises in the sample sourced in the US,
and further comparing it to Table 4 which presents the results for the crises sourced in
the emerging markets, the conclusion is the same.
The incidence of significant contagion is widespread through the great recession.
Putting aside the sub-prime period, there are only two instances of contagion from the
US market and these are from the LTCM crisis to the regional countries of Argentina
and Brazil through the correlation channel (panel (i) of Table 3).6 Less than three
months later Brazil experienced its own crisis, suggesting already its vulnerability.
There are no significant changes in the dependence structures during the dot-com
period (panel (ii)), confirming that the dot-com crisis is contained to it’s own sector.
Panel (iv) of Table 3 shows that during the great recession, all channels of contagion
are clearly operating compared to the other crises sourced in the US. The majority of
countries are also aﬀected by more than one channel. The dependence structures
based on the correlation coeﬃcients change dramatically with evidence of contagion
through this channel from the US equity market to more than half of the markets in the
sample. Further, in almost all cases, contagion also transmits through at least one of the
higher order coskewness channels. Most countries are aﬀected by the 1 ¡→ ; 1  2¢
and the 2 ¡→ ; 2  1¢ channels. Japan and Thailand are only aﬀected through
the 1 ¡→ ; 1  2¢ channel and Germany through the 2 ¡→ ; 2  1¢ channel.
Brazil and Korea are only aﬀected by the correlation channel.
Comparison of the sub-prime period in panel (iii) of Table 3 with the great recession
6Note the use of the finite sample critical values determined in Appendix B.
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Table 3:
Contagion from the US equity market () to recipient markets () during the (i)
LTCM, (ii) dot-com, (iii) sub-prime, and (iv) great recession crises.  is the
correlation based contagion test in (3); The coskewness contagion test
1 ¡→ ; 1  2¢ measures coskewness in terms of the source market returns  and
squared returns of markets  and is based on equation (6). The coskewness contagion
test 2 ¡→ ; 2  1¢ measures coskewness in terms of the squared source market
returns  and returns of markets  and is based on equation (7). pv denotes p-values
with the 5% level of significance denoted by ∗.
Contagion Tests
Recip.
()   1  2    1  2 
(i) Crisis: LTCM (ii) Crisis: dot-com
Arg. 18.97 0.00∗ 0.02 0.87 0.06 0.81 0.08 0.78 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.97
Aus.. 0.15 0.70 0.50 0.48 0.30 0.58 3.56 0.06 0.17 0.68 4.86 0.03
Bra. 7.95 0.00∗ 0.01 0.90 0.05 0.82 2.52 0.11 1.06 0.30 0.01 0.92
Can. 0.02 0.89 0.26 0.61 0.01 0.94 1.97 0.16 0.43 0.51 1.84 0.18
Ger. 3.58 0.06 0.27 0.60 0.19 0.66 0.01 0.92 0.04 0.85 2.40 0.12
HK. 0.13 0.71 2.42 0.12 1.26 0.26 1.05 0.30 2.02 0.15 1.20 0.27
Jap. 0.52 0.47 0.00 0.96 1.81 0.18 0.68 0.41 0.78 0.38 0.27 0.60
Kor. 1.18 0.28 1.93 0.16 0.05 0.82 0.07 0.79 0.02 0.89 0.53 0.46
Rus. 3.13 0.08 0.10 0.76 1.64 0.20 3.14 0.08 0.00 0.99 1.41 0.24
Thai. 1.07 0.30 0.02 0.89 0.06 0.81 0.43 0.51 0.07 0.80 1.43 0.23
UK 0.09 0.76 0.05 0.82 0.03 0.87 0.28 0.60 0.72 0.40 0.05 0.82
(iii) Crisis: sub-prime (iv) Crisis: great recession
Arg. 3.33 0.07 0.02 0.90 2.31 0.13 19.82 0.00∗ 8.70 0.00∗ 16.15 0.00∗
Aus. 1.05 0.31 0.35 0.56 3.72 0.05 27.69 0.00∗ 8.02 0.00∗ 7.74 0.01∗
Bra. 0.04 0.85 1.06 0.30 5.55 0.02∗ 7.24 0.01∗ 0.46 0.50 3.21 0.07
Can. 13.04 0.00∗ 9.19 0.00∗ 18.79 0.00∗ 1.74 0.19 28.94 0.00∗ 33.72 0.00∗
Ger. 2.24 0.13 1.07 0.30 0.25 0.61 0.01 0.94 2.09 0.15 8.97 0.00∗
HK. 0.53 0.47 0.28 0.59 0.01 0.94 13.76 0.00∗ 4.75 0.03∗ 6.42 0.01∗
Jap. 4.41 0.04∗ 0.28 0.60 0.30 0.58 0.12 0.73 9.28 0.00∗ 1.29 0.26
Kor. 0.02 0.89 7.34 0.01∗ 7.18 0.01∗ 6.75 0.01∗ 3.54 0.06 0.74 0.39
Rus. 0.00 0.99 0.54 0.46 2.26 0.13 3.21 0.07 8.26 0.00∗ 11.00 0.00∗
Thai. 0.72 0.40 0.11 0.74 8.52 0.00∗ 25.64 0.00∗ 11.35 0.00∗ 0.73 0.39
UK 3.28 0.07 1.71 0.19 0.03 0.87 3.08 0.08 17.59 0.00∗ 15.75 0.00∗
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in panel (iv) shows that the sub-prime crisis did not result in the transmission of
contagion on a widespread scale. Only Canada is aﬀected by all channels but is not
aﬀected by all channels in the great recession phase suggesting that it’s linkages with
the US reverted to normal quickly. Korea is aﬀected through both coskewness channels
and Brazil and Thailand through one of the coskewness channels. Japan is only aﬀected
through the correlation channel.
The evidence on the hypothesis that crises beginning in the major financial centre of
the US have important consequences for the rest of world is not supported by examining
the first three panels of Table 3. The result where there is little contagion from the US
implies that the spillovers of the LTCM and dot-com crises to the other countries in
the sample are well accounted for by normal interdependencies, and that transmission
channels of shocks across countries have not changed for most countries during these
crises. This is possibly an eﬀect of the US being a large and eﬃcient market, with
linkages well understood and with arbitrage opportunities well exploited. This does
not mean that the countries in the sample are unaﬀected by the US sourced crises, it
just means that there is no change in the way that shocks transmit. That is, there
is no contagion. However, the evidence supports Reinhart and Rogoﬀ suggesting that
the great recession is truly a global financial crisis, at least in the contagion sense, with
linkages across markets not as well understood as previously thought. The evidence
also supports that "This Time is Diﬀerent".
4.3.2 An Index of Crisis Severity
To further explore the extent of the severity of the great recession over time, equally
weighted indexes of crisis severity are constructed using the correlation and coskewness
tests. Taking the non-crisis (6) period as fixed, the correlation and coskewness tests
of contagion are calculated using a rolling 30 day window of returns through the sub-
prime and great recession periods. An indicator variable is then constructed for each
recipient country  which takes a value of 1 if the test statistic is significant at the 005
level of significance. Hence for the correlation tests,
(→) =
½
1 : p-value ≤ 005
0 : otherwise
  6=  (12)
and for the coskewness tests using 1 as an example,
1(→) =
½
1 : p-value ≤ 005
0 : otherwise
  6=  (13)
18
The index of crisis severity ( (→ )) using the correlation test as an example is
 (→ ) = 100 ·
ÃP11
=1 (→)
11
!
 (14)
An overall index  (→ ) is also constructed by combining all channels
 (→ ) = 100 ·
ÃP11
=1 (→) +
P11
=1 1(→) +
P11
=1 2(→)
33
!
 (15)
where 1(→) and 2(→) are the indexes of severity constructed from the
respective coskewness tests.
Figure 3 presents the indexes described in equations (12) to (15). If the index takes
a value of 0, then over the previous 30 days there is no evidence of contagion through a
particular channel. If the index takes a value of 100 then all eleven countries are aﬀected
by contagion from the source which in this case is the US. The figures indicate that
over the sub-prime and great recession periods, it is most likely to be the correlation
based channel through which contagion operates, which is often the case being that
most countries are aﬀected through this channel. The 1 channel is likely to aﬀect
a small number of countries at any one time, while the 2 channel often aﬀects no
countries, but when this channel is operational, it tends to aﬀect multiple countries,
indicating that the changes in the transmission mechanisms of the crisis tends to be
through the volatility of the US to the other countries once the correlation channel is
accounted for.
The indexes for 1 and 2 reveal a rather sharp spike in September of 2008.
For the 1 severity index 90% of countries are aﬀected by contagion through that
channel. The percentage is smaller for 2 but is still substantial with about 60% of
countries aﬀected. The dates of this spike range from (the 30 days up to) September
22, 2008 to September 29, 2008, and mark the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman
brothers. The point to glean from these severity indexes is that it is important to focus
not only on dependence structures through correlation relationships, but in times of
severe crisis, the higher order dependence structures are also significant channels of
contagion.
4.3.3 Emerging Market Sourced Crises
Half of the set of crises in the sample are sourced in emerging markets or regions
including Hong Kong, Russia, Brazil and Argentina. There is no clear pattern across
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Figure 3: Indexes of the severity of contagion in financial markets through the (i)
correlation channel (); (ii) the coskewness 1 channel (1); and (iii) the coskewness
(2) channel; and (iv) all channels (). These indexes represent the percentage
of markets significantly aﬀected by contagion at any point in time.
any of the crises, although it is notable that it is often the developed markets that are
aﬀected by the crises in the emerging markets. For example, Canada, the UK and the
US are both aﬀected through at least one channel in each crisis, while Australia and
Germany are aﬀected in three of the four crises. The UK and Canada are most often
aﬀected through the higher order channels of contagion rather than the correlation
channels. In contrast to the US sourced crises it seems that the crisis event changes
the dynamics of shock transmission between the emerging and developed countries,
providing some evidence that often financial centres are aﬀected by emerging market
crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2003), by potentially being cross-market conduits.
The results that the crisis in Argentina appears to show substantial evidence of
contagion is at first pass unexpected. The correlation channel aﬀects all markets except
for Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Thailand. There is also evidence that there is
1 ¡→ ; 1  2¢ contagion to Canada, and2 ¡→ ; 2  1¢ contagion to Australia,
Germany, Hong Kong, Russia, the UK and the US. These results may be driven by
the fundamental changes occurring in Argentina during this crisis period rather than
contagion. The collapse of the currency board in January 2002 permanently changed
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Table 4:
Contagion from the emerging market crises () to recipient markets () during the (i)
Asian, (ii) Russian, (iii) Brazilian and (iv) Argentinian crises.  is the correlation
based contagion test in (3); The coskewness contagion test 1 ¡→ ; 1  2¢
measures coskewness in terms of the source market returns  and squared returns of
markets  and is based on equation (6). The coskewness contagion test
2 ¡→ ; 2  1¢ measures coskewness in terms of the squared source market
returns  and returns of markets  and is based on equation (7). pv denotes p-values
with the 5% level of significance denoted by ∗.
Contagion Tests
Recip.
()   1  2    1  2 
(i) Crisis: Asia (ii) Crisis: Russia
Arg. 0.35 0.56 0.02 0.89 5.07 0.02∗ 5.38 0.02∗ 0.55 0.46 2.54 0.11
Aus. 0.23 0.63 0.07 0.79 0.73 0.39 10.89 0.00∗ 1.48 0.22 1.97 0.16
Bra. 0.81 0.37 2.04 0.15 3.54 0.06 1.46 0.23 2.89 0.09 3.55 0.06
Can. 0.22 0.64 6.66 0.01∗ 11.43 0.00∗ 21.86 0.00∗ 3.01 0.08 2.74 0.10
Ger. 0.72 0.40 0.05 0.83 0.14 0.70 16.56 0.00∗ 0.15 0.70 2.63 0.10
HK. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.06 0.80 1.04 0.31 0.05 0.82
Jap. 0.83 0.36 0.01 0.93 0.15 0.70 1.30 0.25 3.31 0.07 0.64 0.43
Kor. 0.53 0.47 0.17 0.68 0.19 0.67 3.50 0.06 0.93 0.34 0.72 0.40
Rus. 6.40 0.01∗ 1.15 0.28 0.32 0.57 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Thai. 2.13 0.14 0.19 0.66 0.77 0.38 0.14 0.71 0.04 0.85 0.59 0.44
UK 0.10 0.75 8.43 0.00∗ 1.04 0.31 26.68 0.00∗ 0.44 0.51 0.64 0.43
US 1.47 0.23 0.72 0.40 15.60 0.00∗ 4.44 0.04∗ 0.70 0.40 0.02 0.89
(iii) Crisis: Brazil (iv) Crisis: Argentina
Arg. 0.06 0.80 8.16 0.00∗ 6.09 0.01∗ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Aus. 0.60 0.44 7.25 0.01∗ 10.20 0.00∗ 4.38 0.04∗ 0.26 0.61 4.28 0.04∗
Bra. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 76.28 0.00∗ 2.35 0.13 1.36 0.24
Can. 1.85 0.17 8.99 0.00∗ 1.97 0.16 20.77 0.00∗ 3.87 0.05∗ 3.77 0.05
Ger. 8.29 0.00∗ 0.92 0.34 3.66 0.06 12.08 0.00∗ 0.01 0.94 9.36 0.00∗
HK. 0.33 0.57 1.91 0.17 1.89 0.17 2.39 0.12 2.01 0.16 3.95 0.05∗
Jap. 0.86 0.35 0.71 0.40 12.06 0.00∗ 0.30 0.58 1.62 0.20 0.28 0.59
Kor. 1.26 0.26 0.00 0.95 0.29 0.59 0.02 0.90 0.89 0.35 1.59 0.21
Rus. 1.64 0.20 1.30 0.25 0.18 0.67 10.92 0.00∗ 0.18 0.67 5.73 0.02∗
Thai. 0.18 0.67 0.00 0.95 1.13 0.29 1.92 0.17 0.08 0.77 0.02 0.89
UK 0.18 0.67 9.63 0.00∗ 10.41 0.00∗ 25.42 0.00∗ 0.07 0.79 25.92 0.00∗
US 7.66 0.01∗ 0.21 0.64 0.16 0.69 23.26 0.00∗ 1.14 0.29 15.55 0.00∗
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the relationship between the US and Argentina through the change in the currency
arrangements, and hence is reflected in most of the other markets in the sample as
well. This is not necessarily evidence of contagion, but will be reflected as contagion
in these statistics, as even in a non-crisis period, the relationship between Argentina
and the other markets change permanently.
4.4 One Post-Crisis is the Next Pre-Crisis
One of the biggest challenges and one often swept under the carpet in work on contagion
is the dating of the non-crisis and crisis periods. The choices for the dating of the crises
are explored in Section 4.2 and are more often commented on in the literature. However,
when taken in historical context, one post-crisis period is the pre-crisis period of the
next crisis. For this paper this creates several challenges, as it is sometimes the case
that crisis periods run into each other. Hence it is not straightforward to choose the
beginning of the non-crisis period. This section explores the sensitivity of the choice
of the non-crisis and crisis periods by using all non-crisis period data available in the
sample as the non-crisis period in 4.4.1, and by examining the behavior of contagion
tests purely within a potential crisis period to date the end of a crisis in 4.4.2.
4.4.1 Using all Non-Crisis Data
The contagion tests for each crisis are re-run in this section by comparing each crisis
period to the characteristics of the non-crisis data of the entire sample period. The
non-crisis period consists of all data not considered to be in crisis
 = {1 2 3 4 5 6} 
and consists of  = 2168 observations.
Only the results for the crises sourced in the US are presented to save space. The
qualitative conclusions about each crisis are not necessarily similar when using the two
approaches.7 For the great recession the results are almost the same with contagion
being found in three more cases in the higher order tests than when only pre-crisis
data is used, and with contagion not being found twice in the latter model compared
to the benchmark model. The LTCM crisis is identical to the earlier version. The most
diﬀerent results are in the dot-com crisis where the correlation channel is active to the
7The results are available on request, but are not presented here to conserve space.
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developed countries in the sample. It is in the emerging market crises where the results
diﬀer most.
This robustness exercise points to the importance of choosing the right benchmark
for analyzing contagion. It is clear the most of the US sourced crises and particularly the
great recession are relatively robust across definitions of crisis periods. This supports
the results of Section 4.3.1 examining contagion coming from the US, and may well
indicate that there is little structural break in the transmission of financial market
shocks occurring post-crisis periods for countries with the US. On the other hand, it
is likely that the relationship of the emerging market economies with international
financial markets fundamentally change after their own crises. Until a better method
of dating crisis and non-crisis periods emerges, using pre-crisis data as the non-crisis
benchmark seems to be the most logical way to proceed as this is the information that
financial participants have when making decisions.
4.4.2 Within Crisis Contagion Testing
This section considers the transmission of contagion from an alternative viewpoint to
aid in the dating of the end of a crisis, at least in terms of the operation of the contagion
channels. The example of the great recession is used with a focus on the correlation tests
given their importance by the severity of the crisis indexes of Section 4.3.2. Assuming
that it is known that there is severe crisis transmission in the immediate aftermath
of the trigger such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the correlation contagion test
is conducted by comparing the initial phase of the crisis (defined here to be the crisis
period,  = 8  = 1 2 30) with a rolling window of 30 observations in the period
following the initial shock to the end of the sample. The rolling window takes the role
of the non-crisis period in each of the change in the correlation test statistics. That is,
the non-crisis period for the first calculated test statistics is  = 8  = 31 32 60.
Assuming that contagion exists in the height of the crisis, and the initial evidence
indicates that contagion aﬀects most of the financial system during this crisis, the hy-
pothesis is that there will be a change in the dependence structures of markets once
contagious transmission channels resolve themselves. As calm returns to financial mar-
kets, or at least as the dynamics of the financial market system either change or return
to normal (albeit with higher volatility), the test statistics will become significant. This
again represents a test of the null hypothesis of no change in the transmission channels
0 : | = 
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compared to the alternative of a statistically significant change in the transmission
channels
1 : | 6= 
Figure 4 presents the rolling correlation test p-values for each country and provides
interesting insights into the dynamics of the crisis. The transmission channels of several
countries over time appear to not change dramatically over the course of the crisis.
Countries such as Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Thailand, and to an extent Australia,
all generally report high p-values ( 005) indicating that the transmission channels
of the crisis do not change in comparison to the initial period of the crisis particularly
much. These are all countries that were not aﬀected by the most recent crisis in real
terms.
Brazil, Germany and the UK exhibit similar p-value patterns. Inspection of the
reported correlations after the initial shock indicates that the dynamics of the crisis do
not change very much until around July 2009. The cross market dynamics of Argentina
and Canada with respect to the US also seem to quickly separate in the period following
the initial shock compared to the dynamics in the midst of the crisis.
5 Conclusions
This paper examined from a diﬀerent perspective, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2008b) "This
Time Is Diﬀerent" syndrome. The "This Time Is Diﬀerent" syndrome is that prior to
economic crises that have occurred throughout history, society believes that prosperity
will permanently continue because policy makers have mastered the management of the
economy and technological innovations mean sustained growth. This paper addressed
the syndrome of "This Time Is Diﬀerent" from a within a crisis period perspective.
During crises, even countries with sound fundamentals worry that they too will be
aﬀected and take steps to contain the transmission from the crisis markets as they
worry that "This Time Is Diﬀerent". Linkages with crisis markets that did not seem
to exist before suddenly appear.
Eight crisis episodes from Asia in 1997-1998 to the great recession in 2008-2010
were examined to establish in what sense "This Time Is Diﬀerent" in terms of the
international transmission of crises through contagion during each episode. Contagion
was defined as a significant change in the dependence structures of asset returns during
a crisis compared to a non-crisis period, and included correlation based measures and
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Figure 4: Within-crisis period rolling correlation test p-values during the great reces-
sion.
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higher order dependence structures through coskewness (Fry, Martin and Tang, 2010).
The results showed that the great recession was actually diﬀerent to any of the
other crises of the past two decades with all transmission channels operating. Draw-
ing on Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008b), the paper also provided evidence that the great
recession can be thought of as a global financial crisis rather than a severe financial
crisis. However, it was not the case that the other US sourced crises were as systemic
as the great recession. In almost all US sourced crises, there was virtually no evidence
of contagion. It is possible that the well developed nature of the US market means
that crises transmit through normal inter linkages rather than through new or altered
channels, even during crises.
The emerging market sourced crises showed no clear pattern of transmission through
contagion. However, often developed markets were aﬀected by emerging market crises.
In contrast to the US sourced crises it seemed that emerging market crises were reflected
in a changed relationship between the emerging market and financial centres.
Some attention was devoted to choosing the benchmark such as a non-crisis period
for comparison with the crisis data. The choice of benchmark proved to be just as
diﬃcult as the choice of crisis period. The correct dating of crises in conjunction with
the correct dating of non-crisis periods is an area in which more rigorous research is
needed.
Examining historically the crises in financial markets over the last decade raises the
question of why are there so many financial market crises over this period? Financial
market crises appear to take policy makers and market participants by surprise, yet
Figure 1 shows how prevalent they really are. The lingering question is, in fact, are
these crises related to each other? Do the policy responses bringing economies out
of crises sow the seeds for the next one? For example, the low interest rates coming
out of the dot-com crisis and the Greenspan put (Goodhart, 2008) appear to explain
some of the sub-prime and great recession periods. Further research needs to focus
on modelling these crises jointly through time with a view of explaining concurrent
crises through the resolution of the previous ones. The current state of the global
economy and the policy challenges yet to be overcome would hint that these questions
are imperative.
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A Summary of Crisis Dating in Selected Papers
The following tables provide an overview of literature on each crisis and their choice of
source crisis asset markets, non-crisis date choices and crisis date choices.
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B Finite Sample Properties
This section calculates the critical values for the three tests of contagion using a Monte
Carlo experiment, with attention devoted to the duration of the crisis period . Crisis
periods vary in length but may be quite short raising the possibility of small sample
issues. To calculate the critical values for each test statistic under the null hypothesis
of no contagion, a series of random samples of non-crisis and crisis data are generated.
The distribution of equity returns under the null hypothesis are assumed to be bivariate
normal with zero mean and variance-covariance matrices  and .
The variance-covariance matrices of the equity returns data in the sub-periods are
set at
 =
∙
229 045
045 240
¸
  =
∙
11 35
35 59
¸

 is set using the average non-crisis variance of the source and recipient returns,
while the covariances are determined by taking the average of the covariances of all
asset pairs in the non-crisis period.  is determined using crisis period data similarly.
Under this parametrization, the correlations between the two assets are  = 019 and
 = 042 respectively. The adjusted Forbes and Rigobon (2002) correlation coeﬃcient
is  = 020 which under the null of no contagion is close to the non-crisis value of .
The critical values are obtained for , 1and 2 for values of  spanning
 = {15 30 60 90 150 200 250 350 600 700} 
The non-crisis sample size is  = 1472 which is consistent with the number of obser-
vations in the non-crisis period in the sample.
The results of the Monte Carlo experiment using 100 000 replications are contained
in Table 5. As the crisis sample size increases, the distribution of equity returns tends
to follow a 21 distribution. If  ≤ 30, the test statistic tends to be biased and the
critical values require adjusting following the first two rows of Table 5.
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Table 5:
Comparison of critical values for the tests of contagion for crisis sample sizes. The
non-crisis sample size is  = 2168. Based on 100 000 replications.
 test 1 test 2 test
Sig. level/ 0.025 0.05 0.1 0.025 0.05 0.1 0.025 0.05 0.1

15 6.12 4.72 3.31 4.57 3.39 2.32 4.42 3.22 2.27
30 5.26 4.08 2.87 4.88 3.63 2.49 5.06 3.71 2.52
60 5.12 3.91 2.74 4.84 3.63 2.51 4.95 3.77 2.69
90 5.14 3.95 2.72 4.89 3.76 2.63 4.9 3.72 2.56
150 5.21 3.88 2.72 5.08 3.68 2.65 5.11 3.91 2.67
200 4.94 3.82 2.71 5.05 3.81 2.62 5.18 3.93 2.76
250 5.07 3.85 2.68 4.84 3.69 2.61 5.03 3.78 2.71
350 4.97 3.96 2.73 5.06 3.85 2.70 5.41 4.04 2.84
600 5.05 3.85 2.64 5.08 3.93 2.77 4.89 3.74 2.68
700 5.21 3.97 2.73 4.94 3.79 2.73 4.81 3.73 2.66
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